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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-3610
____________
CYNTHIA R. WINDER,
Appellant
v.
POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 11-cv-00878)
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 13, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 14, 2013)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Cynthia Winder appeals the District Court’s summary judgment dismissing her
employment discrimination claim as time-barred. We will affirm.

I

In November 2007, the United States Postal Service’s Philadelphia District Office
issued both internal and external vacancy announcements for the position of Employee
Assistance Program (EAP) Clinical Supervisor. Winder, an African-American female
and one of the EAP Assistant Counselors, applied for the position. In February 2008,
Lisa Jordan, an African-American female and Manager of Human Resources for the
Philadelphia District Office, interviewed Winder.
On April 1, 2008, Jordan met with Winder to tell her that she was not selecting
Winder for the position. Jordan’s and Winder’s version of the events of the meeting
differ slightly. According to Jordan, she did not select Winder because she believed that
Winder needed to develop her ―supervisory and leadership skills.‖ App. 145. Winder, by
contrast, maintains that Jordan told her that she did not have enough ―supervisory
experience.‖ App. 44–45. After consideration of the external applications, Jordan hired
Ronald Erenhouse, a white male, as the EAP Clinical Supervisor on October 25, 2008.
On November 5, 2008, Winder contacted an EEO counselor to complain about
alleged discrimination. A formal complaint was filed on December 12, 2008. Winder
alleged that Jordan wanted to select a white male over a black female for the EAP
supervisor position, despite the qualifications of the candidates. The Postal Service
dismissed the EEO complaint in January 2009 as untimely. However, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission reversed the dismissal in May 2009, finding that
Winder did not have reasonable suspicion that she had been discriminated against until
2

Erenhouse was hired in October 2008.
On February 4, 2011, Winder filed a civil complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging discrimination on the basis of sex
and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.1 On April 30, 2012, the Postal Service filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing: (1) Winder’s claim was untimely; (2) Winder could not make out a prima facie
case of discrimination; and (3) Winder could not establish that the Postal Service’s
justification for not selecting her for the supervisor position was pretext for
discrimination. Winder filed a response to the summary judgment motion and the District
Court heard oral argument. On August 17, 2012, the District Court granted the motion,
concluding that Winder had not timely contacted an EEO counselor about her
discrimination claim. The Court did not address any of the Postal Service’s other
arguments. This appeal followed.
II2
Winder makes two arguments on appeal. First, she argues that the District Court
erred in determining that her claim accrued on April 1, 2008, instead of on October 25,
2008. Second, she claims that even if April 1, 2008, is the operative date, the time
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Winder also filed a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but the parties
stipulated to its dismissal on May 9, 2011.
2

The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

limitation should be equitably tolled. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s
summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. Ruehl v. Viacom,
Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Our review of a
district court’s choice and interpretation of applicable tolling principles is plenary as well.
Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 380 n.6.
A
Before bringing a Title VII suit in federal court, a federal employee must initiate
contact with an EEO counselor ―within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be
discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of
the action.‖ 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). This 45-day time limit operates akin to a statute
of limitations: a claim brought more than 45 days after the date it accrued will be barred.
See Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997).
Here, the 45-day limitations period began to run on April 1, 2008, the date Winder
discovered that Jordan was not going to promote her to the EAP Clinical Supervisor
position. On that date, Winder knew she had been injured (by her non-selection) and that
her injury had been caused by the conduct of another party (the Postal Service). See
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran, & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994)
(limitations period begins to run when ―the plaintiff has discovered or, by exercising
reasonable diligence, should have discovered (1) that he or she has been injured, and
(2) that this injury has been caused by another party’s conduct‖ (citing Bohus v. Beloff,
4

950 F.2d 919, 925 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Although Winder argues that her injury was not complete until October 25, 2008,
the date Erenhouse was hired, it is well-settled that ―a claim accrues in a federal cause of
action upon awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness that this injury constitutes a
legal wrong.‖ Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 1385, 1391 (holding that the statute of
limitations began to run on the date of the plaintiff’s termination, not on the date she
discovered that a male was hired in her place); Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network,
342 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s injury was complete and
discovered when he was terminated, not when he learned that he was replaced by a
younger worker). Furthermore, Winder’s belief that the position could have been reposted—thereby giving her an opportunity to reapply—does not change the fact that the
actual injury occurred on April 1, 2008, when Winder was informed that she would not be
selected.
Winder contacted an EEO counselor on November 5, 2008, long after the 45-day
limitations period beginning April 1, 2008, had run. Accordingly, Winder’s claim is
time-barred unless the limitations period may be equitably tolled.
B
Although the doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to stop the limitations
period from running after a claim has accrued, both the Supreme Court and our Court
have recognized that the doctrine should be applied ―only sparingly.‖ Irwin v. Dep’t of
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Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d
584, 591 (3d Cir. 2005). One situation in which equitable tolling may be appropriate is
―where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of
action, and that deception causes non-compliance with an applicable limitations
provision.‖ Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 591. A plaintiff seeking to invoke this basis for
equitable tolling must show that ―he or she could not, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, have discovered essential information bearing on his or her claim.‖ Ruehl, 500
F.3d at 384 (quoting In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d 325, 339 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Winder has the burden of establishing that the equitable tolling doctrine applies.
Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 591 (citing Courtney v. La Salle Univ., 124 F.3d 499, 505 (3d Cir.
1997)).
Winder argues that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because Jordan
actively misled her by ―provid[ing] her with a false and misleading reason for her nonhire‖—that she lacked ―supervisory experience.‖ Appellant’s Br. 16, 18. She claims that
she had no way of knowing that Jordan had discriminated against her until she spoke with
Erenhouse in October 2008 and discovered that Jordan had hired ―an external candidate
who had no prior EAP supervisory experience.‖ Id. at 19.
Winder’s claims are belied by the record. Winder testified in her deposition in this
case that she began to suspect that Jordan was discriminating against her as early as 2005,
when she was not chosen to be Acting EAP Clinical Supervisor after the previous
6

supervisor’s resignation. Furthermore, Winder admitted that by April 2008, it became
apparent that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race and sex even though
she ―didn’t want to see it.‖ She also acknowledged that in April 2008, she complained to
a friend that she had been discriminated against when she was not selected for the
supervisor position. Finally, Winder was aware in April 2008 that Jordan was reviewing
external applications, and in August 2008 she was aware that Erenhouse was being
interviewed. Given her beliefs that she had been discriminated against, she did not act
like a ―person with a reasonably prudent regard for his or her rights.‖ Oshiver, 38 F.3d at
1389. Winder made no effort to inquire into the hiring process or ask Jordan for a fuller
explanation of her decision. See Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 384–85; Podobnik, 409 F.3d at 591–
92; Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 834 (3d Cir. 1979). Accordingly,
Winder cannot show that, by acting with reasonable diligence, she could not have
discovered essential information bearing on her claim. Equitable tolling is thus
inappropriate in this case.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Winder’s claim is time-barred and that she
is not entitled to equitable tolling. We will therefore affirm.
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